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Abstract:  An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit 
dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses.  The existence of these 
responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behavior is typically hidden 
from the researcher.  We present a simple model showing that one can identify gaming by 
estimating the correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization 
before and after the measure has been activated.  Our hypothesis is that gaming takes place if this 
correlation decreases with activation.  Using data from a public sector organization, we find 
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Explicit performance measures may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also 
known as gaming responses (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 and Baker 1992), which often prove 
costly to organizations.  For examples of gaming responses and the damage they cause in the 
private sector, see the specific references to performance pay and employee misconduct (at Sears’, 
among other firms) in Baker et al (1994). For an example from the public sector, see the study of 
teacher cheating in high schools by Jacob and Levitt (2002).   Understanding when gaming 
responses take place, the extent of these responses and their nature, is essential to rule out poor 
incentive designs that could put the organization at risk and also more generally to improve the 
effectiveness of measurement systems.  Gaming behavior, however, is difficult to identify because 
it is typically hidden from the researcher and in many cases (at least for some time) from the 
organization as well.   
Despite this difficulty, a growing literature has demonstrated the existence of gaming in 
several organizational contexts.  See Prendergast (1999) for a review.  Following the seminal work 
of Healy (1985), this literature has circumvented the identification challenges by focusing on 
responses where gaming can be unambiguously identified from the specifics of the contract (e.g. 
manipulating accounting figures).  The main shortcoming of this approach is that by its very case-
study nature, it can be applied only to a narrow set of gaming responses and it requires detailed 
information on the contracts and on agent behavior that is often difficult to observe.  There is no 
general method to address the question of whether a performance measure generates gaming. 
We develop a new approach to identify gaming.  Our starting assumption is that different 
performance measures generate different gaming responses.  Although performance measures share 
in common the feature that they attempt to communicate the true organizational goal, they are 
imperfect proxies and their source of imperfections is likely to differ.  The investment strategies 
that optimally game a given measure may have little impact elsewhere. We propose to estimate 
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of a performance measure. 
We extend Baker’s 2002 gaming model to derive a simple test of gaming that only requires 
estimating how the correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the 
organization changes after the measure has been activated in the incentive system.  We show that 
gaming takes place if this correlation decreases after the introduction of the new performance 
measure.  The intuition for this test is that after a measure is activated, the agent takes measure-
specific actions that maximize the measure but that do not maximize the true goal. These actions 
increase the variability of the measure thus reducing the correlation between the measure and the 
true goal. 
We test this hypothesis in the incentive system of a federal training organization created 
under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), which operated from 1982 to 2000.  There are 
several reasons for choosing this case study.  To start, JTPA used incentive-backed performance 
measurement, assessing job training output with measures of the labor market success of training 
participants and rewarding successful managers with small budgetary increases.  In addition, JTPA 
was the object of a large-scale experimental study that produced unusually precise and complete 
information on performance outcomes and organizational value.  Another important reason for 
using this case study is that in the late 1980’s the Department of Labor introduced new measures.  
For these new measures, we can observe performance outcomes as well as organizational 
outcomes, before and after the measure’s introduction. 
JTPA’s stated objective was to raise the earnings ability and lower the welfare dependency of 
the poor. JTPA evaluated local managers’ performance by their clients’ labor market success (e.g. 
employment status) at the end, or shortly after the end of training.  We test whether the correlation 
between the new performance measures and the true goal of the organization decreased after the 
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correlation as predicted by the model.  
This paper contributes to two literatures.  First, and as mentioned earlier, it contributes to the 
literature trying to demonstrate the existence of gaming responses.  A substantial fraction of the 
literature focuses on gaming responses where the agent uses its discretion over the timing and 
reporting of performance outcomes to meet performance thresholds (Healy, 1985; Asch, 1990; 
Oyer, 1998; Jacob and Levitt, 2002; Oettinger, 2002; Burgess et al., 2002; and Courty and 
Marschke, 2004). In contrast, our approach offers a more general test of gaming that only requires 
computing correlations before and after the introduction of a new measure.  The main advantages 
of our approach are that it is general and it relies on data that can be easily collected.    
This paper also contributes to the literature on the implementation of performance 
measurement. An important pre-occupation of the literature is the selection of performance 
measures (e.g., Gibbs et al, 2004). Researchers in this literature, and practitioners as well, evaluate 
the usefulness of performance measures based on how correlated they are with the true objective of 
the organization. Ittner and Larcker (1998), Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan (2000), and van Praag 
and Cools (2001), for example, use correlation methods to evaluate alternative performance 
measures for managerial compensation plans in the private sector.  Much of the recent policy and 
public administration literature is also concerned with performance measurement, as interest in 
performance measurement and accountability in the public sector has waxed in recent years (e.g. 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, 2002).  Researchers in these literatures test the validity of 
performance measures by correlating them with “true” measures of the goal of the organization. 
Measures that appear the most correlated with the goal are deemed most likely to be successful.   
These methods, however, lack a theoretical justification.  By showing that a validation method 
based on correlation prior to the measure’ s introduction is flawed because it fails to capture the 
gaming strategies available to the agent, our model is a contribution to the practice of performance 
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criterion to select performance measures, one can use the change in correlation to identify whether 
gaming takes place after a measure is introduced.        
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple framework to test for gaming. 
Section 3 presents some preliminary evidence consistent with this framework and tests our 
predictions in the JTPA organization. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2 Model  
We adopt the multi-tasking principal agent paradigm (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 
2002; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Banker and Datar, 2001) building upon our previous work (Courty 
and Marschke, 2003a).
2   In contrast to these works, which focus on the principal’s problem of 
choosing the optimal contract, we focus on the agent’s decision problem because the goal of the 
analysis is to investigate how the agent responds differently to different sets of performance 
measures.   
To keep matter simple, we assume that there are two performance measures.  We investigate 
whether the agent’s responses to performance measure one differ in a systematic way from her 
responses when performance measure two is introduced, and whether one can identify the existence 
of gaming from the differences in responses.  We assume that the introduction of performance 
measure two is exogenously given.  A possible interpretation is that the principal does not know ex-
ante which measure is likely to perform well.  Different principals experiment with different 
measures and this generates exogenous variations in performance measures.   
A different interpretation, which matches our application, is that the principal first uses 
performance measure one and later introduces performance measure two.  Under that interpretation, 
the introduction of measure two could be endogenous.  That is, it could be triggered by the 
                                                 
2 The theoretical literature on the design of incentives is reviewed in Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast (1999). More 
recently, Dixit (2002) reviews the incentive literature but focusing on those issues that are specific to the public sector. 
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her early actions may trigger a change in performance measures.  Whether the agent makes such 
anticipations depends on the application.  In the model we present, we ignore this possibility 
because the presence of more than independent 600 agents in our application implies that each 
agent has very little influence on the principal’s decision to introduce a new measure.
3    
The agent invests in tasks.  One could think of a task as a project.  In the context of JTPA, for 
example, a task could be a single enrollee or a group of enrollees.  The agent has to allocate 
resources across enrollees and the issue is how different performance measures change the agent’s 
resource allocation.  Each task is characterized by its type α. The agent privately observes the 
task’s type α and invests in effort and gaming.  By assumption, the principal values only effort.   
For each task, the agent chooses a vector of investments (e,g)=(e0,e1,e2,g1,g2).  The 
performance outcome for task α on measure i=1,2 is 
pi,α(e,g)=v0,αe0+vi,αei+wi,αgi. 
Our specification ignores performance measurement noise.  This assumption is not restrictive for 
the analysis, which focuses on gaming rather than on the optimal weighting of performance 
measures.
4      
The principal’s objective or social value-added of investment vector (e,g) on task α is,  
Vα(e,g)=v0,αe0+ v1,αe1+ v2,αe2. 
This specification recognizes the distinction made in the literature between multi-tasking and 
gaming.
5  The common dimension of effort e0 captures what both performance measures and the 
                                                 
3 In a single agent model, the agent anticipates the impact of her actions in stage one on the probability that the 
performance measure could be changed in stage two. The equilibrium dynamic of gaming investment and the decision 
to change the measure would be more complex.  The main predictions of the model would likely follow, however, as 
long as in equilibrium the principal sometimes changes the set of performance measure used, which is the departing 
point of this research.  
4 In the standard principal agent model, measurement noise plays a role in the determination of the optimal contract, but 
it does not directly influence the agent’s investment decisions. 
5 Our specification is very similar to the specification in Baker (2002), who assumes that, V=f.a+ε and P=g.a+φ, where 
f and g are vectors of marginal products of actions, a, in the principal’s objective and performance outcome equations.  
We ignore the error terms ε and φ as they do not influence the agent’s action choice (see previous footnote).  In 
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some dimensions of effort (multi-tasking) and both also have a gaming dimension.  Multi-tasking 
is captured by the fact that each measure captures only one of the two effort margins e1 and e2.   
Gaming is captured by the margins g1 and g2 which increase the performance measures but not the 
true goal.
6  Gaming investments are measure specific. The gaming actions that increase 
performance measure one leave performance measure two unchanged and vice versa. This is 
reasonable as long as the two performance measures are unlikely to share the same weaknesses.  
Finally, to draw empirical predictions, we will assume the tasks are randomly drawn from the α 
population.  To simplify, we will assume that the vi,α and wi,α are orthogonal to one another.   
The focus of this paper is on identifying the existence of gaming responses g1 and g2.  We say 
that performance measure i is gameable if wi,α>0 for some α.   
The costs of effort and gaming are the same across all tasks and are respectively ½ei
2 and ½gi
2, 
for i=1,2.  In our model the performance outcome for measure i is the sum of performance 
outcomes over all tasks 
Pi=∑α pi,α(eα,gα). 
Assume for now that the weights on performance measure one and two are β1 and β2, 
respectively.  The agent chooses effort and gaming investment (eα,gα) to maximize  
∑iβi[Mi-½∑α





To simplify the exposition, let ei,α(β1,β2) and gi,α(β1,β2)) denote the optimal investment strategy 
for task α when the performance weights are β1 and β2 respectively and similarly denote pi,α(β1,β2) 
and Vα(,β1,β2) the performance outcomes and principal’s objective.  The agent’s investment 
response is 
 
addition, we assume that each element of the vector of action can be decomposed into effort, multi-tasking, and gaming 
components a=(e0,e1,e2,g1,g2).  By linearity, this is equivalent to assuming that one can separate the tasks that enter (f,g) 
into three components: perfectly aligned, multi-tasking and gaming.     
6 One could assume that some gaming activities have a destructive effect on the principal’s objective.  Formally, g 
would enter negatively in Vα(e,g).  This would reinforce our main prediction but complicate the exposition without 
adding any new insights.   
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ei,α(β1,β2)= βivi,α,  for i=1,2 
gi,α(β1,β2)= βiwi, for i=1,2. 
Investment (eα(β1,β2),gα(β1,β2)) generates the realized performance outcome for measure i 
pi,α(β1,β2)=e0,α(β1,β2)v0,α+ei,α(β1,β2)vi,α+gi,α(β1,β2)wi,α.    (1) 
The principal’s realized objective for task α is,  
Vα(β1,β2)=e0,α(β1,β2)v0,α+∑iei,α(β1,β2)vi,α. 
The realized performance outcome and the realized objective depend on the agent’s investment, 
which in turn depends on which measure is activated and on the performance weights.   
The model makes several simplifying assumptions.  The central assumption of the model is 
that different measures are likely to display different gaming weaknesses.  As we will see, 
conditional on this assumption it is possible to identify measure-specific gaming responses.  In 
addition, the model assumes that (a) the performance measures and organizational goal are linear 
in the agent’s actions and (b) the marginal products of actions are independent.  Although 
simplistic, these assumptions are made for tractability and should be interpreted as a first order 
approximation of a more complex specification.       
 
Performance Measure Activation 
Organizations often change the performance measures they use, sometimes replacing outdated 
ones, or augmenting the old measures with new ones as they become available.  Here we consider 
the latter case. Extending the analysis to the former case, however, where one performance measure 
is replaced by another, yields similar implications. 
Assume that the principal first activates only performance measure one and then decides to 
activate measure two.  The performance weights change from (β1,0) to (β1’,β2’).  Do performance 
outcomes change in a systematic way as the set of activated measure changes?  Expression (1) 
  7suggests a prediction on how the mean of a performance measure should change after it is 
activated.  If overall incentive weights do not decrease, β1’+β2’≥β1, the mean performance 
outcome on measure two should increase when that measure is activated.  Similarly, the variance 










An increase in the mean or variance after the introduction of a measure is consistent with 
gaming but it is also consistent with an allocation of effort to non-gaming activities that are 
measure specific (multi-tasking).  This implies that the evidence of performance outcome increases 
is not sufficient to conclude that gaming takes place.  Changes in correlation, however, can provide 
evidence of gaming, as we argue next.  
The correlation between p2 and V, before the introduction of measure two is 
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The correlation is less than one because performance measure two does not capture the tasks that 
are specific to measure one.  When measure two is introduced in the contract, the agent starts to invest 
in measure specific effort, and also in measure specific gaming.  The correlation changes to 
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Proposition 1: A performance measure is gameable if the correlation between the measure 
and the principal’s objective decreases after the introduction of the measure. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The correlation between measure two and the true goal can increase or decrease after that 
measure has been introduced and this will depend on the relative impact of gaming noise and 
measure specific effort.  It is worth considering two benchmark cases.  Consider first the case 
  8where there are no measure specific actions (v2,α=0 for all α) and assume Varw .  Then, 
the correlation between measure two and the true goal decreases after that measure has been 
introduced.  The intuition for this finding is that the introduction of the performance measure 
increases the noisiness of measure two and therefore decreases its predictive power.  Consider next 




, 2 α α Varv >
i,α=0 for all α).  In this case the correlation 
increases and this is because the agent invests more in measure specific effort which increases the 
predictive power of the measure (the covariance between V and m2 increases).   
Proposition 1 implies that a sufficient condition to conclude that a measure generates gaming 
is to test whether the correlation between the measure and the true goal decreases after the measure 
is introduced.  If the correlation stays constant or increases then there could still be gaming but in 
an amount low relative to the measure specific effort responses.  The advantage of this proposition 
is that it requires from the researcher little information on the incentive contract.  In particular, the 
identification of gaming does not necessitate any knowledge on the incentive weights, which is 
notoriously difficult to obtain.  To conduct that test, one only needs to know when a performance 
measure is introduced and to observe the true goal and the measure before and after introduction.  
Our model formally demonstrates the suspicion that the correlation between a performance 
measure and value-added is endogenous.  Baker (2002) argues that a correlation measure does not 
tell the incentive designer anything about the gaming strategies available to the agent.  Our model 
not only confirms that point but it also shows that the change in correlation that takes place after 
the activation of a measure can be used to identify gaming.  Note that others have also argued that 
performance outcomes should change after a measure is activated.  For example, Meyer and Gupta 
(1994) argued that the worthiness of a performance measure degrades after it is activated.  The 
concept of degradation, however, does not suggest clear statistical predictions for how the measure 
and the true goal should change.   
  9Finally, our model shows that using a correlation measure to identify good performance 
measures can be misleading.  To illustrate this point, assume the principal is considering adding a 
new performance measure to complement an existing one.  Assume there are two candidate 
measures, measure 2 and 2’ that are identical in all respects, but performance measure 2 is more 
correlated with the principal’s objective than measure 2’.  Selecting measure 2 on this criterion 
may be misleading.  In fact, it may turn out that the correlation between the true goal and measures 
2 drops after its introduction.  It is even be possible that measure 2’ is more correlated with the true 
goal, if the correlation is measured after the measure’s introduction.  Although our model does not 
provide a method to select performance measures, it suggests that one has to be cautious in using a 
correlation based selection criterion. 
 
3  Empirical Application to a Government Job Training Program 
       
3.1 Literature Review and Preliminary Evidence 
Data on organizations that relate performance outcomes to measures of organizational value 
are scarce.  This kind of data exists for a large federal job training program and for this reason and 
this program’s experience with performance measurement systems it is the focus of our empirical 
work.    Here we describe the organization that we study and the empirical literature examining 
performance measurement that bears on our study. 
Job training programs that serve the economically disadvantaged have been an important part 
of the federal government’s war on poverty at least since the Kennedy administration.    In the 
1970s several influential studies showing the ineffectiveness of this job training prompted Congress 
to reconsider how job training programs were constituted.   Beginning with the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 and continuing under the legislation that supplanted JTPA, the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, the bureaucracy that runs the federal government’s most 
  10important job training program for the poor has become highly decentralized.   Training is 
conducted by over 600 local job training centers, each enjoying substantial discretion over who 
they enroll and what types of training they provide their enrollees.  By allowing this discretion, 
Congress hoped that job training administrators would be free to use their expertise in training and 
their superior knowledge of “conditions on the ground” to provide better training.  But in increasing 
administrators’ discretion over their work, Congress anticipated that administrators would also have 
greater means to pursue private objectives.  Therefore, in addition to allowing more freedom in 
decision-making, Congress has sought to provide stronger incentives to promote programmatic 
objectives by linking financial incentives to measures of program outcomes.  Thus, since JTPA’s 
passage, training center budgets have been partly contingent on their performance on explicitly 
defined measures.  Under JTPA—our analysis of the program focuses on the late 1980s—these 
measures were variants of program participants’ employment and wage rates measured at the time 
the participants “graduated” from their training. 
 
Performance measure validation literature 
JTPA’s stated goal was to promote increases in the employment and earnings of enrollees 
(JTPA, Section 106(a)). Numerous studies have attempted to test the ability of such short-term 
outcome-based measures to capture long-term earnings and employment gains of enrollees.   These 
studies have been conducted using job training data from JTPA, but also from other job training 
programs that had not been subject to performance-based measurement.   
Gay and Borus (1980), Friedlander (1988) and Zornitsky, et al. (1988) conducted their studies 
of the association of short-run outcomes and long-term employment and earnings gains based on 
data from job training programs that had no explicit performance measurement backed by financial 
incentives.   Gay and Borus found that the correlation of employment measures and earnings 
impacts were sometimes negative.   In contrast, Friedlander and Zornitsky both report that enrollees 
  11who were likely to produce high scores on employment-based performance measures were also 
likely to generate high earnings and employment impacts. In their studies based on data generated 
from JTPA, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and Barnow (2000), however, found little 
evidence that the performance measures and earnings impacts were significantly correlated.   
Barnow concluded “there is only a weak correspondence between the two measures and that the 
Department of Labor should avoid making significant rewards or sanctions based on [them].” 
(Barnow, p. 118)  Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith found that the performance measures “are weakly 
and sometimes perversely, related to long-term impacts.” (Heckman et al, p. 778) An important 
implication of our model is that the correlation between the performance measure and the goal of 
the organization is endogenous. That is, because placing incentives on performance measures cause 
agents to find low cost strategies to raise the performance measure that do not also raise the goal of 
the organization, the correlation between the performance measure and the goal of the organization 
degrades.   What is interesting about the above-cited studies for the purpose of our study is that 
only in programs where performance is uncompensated (Friedlander and Zornitsky et al) have 
researchers found statistically significant correlation between short-term performance measures and 
impacts.   
Of course this observation is not definitive because we compare studies that are based on 
different programs and on different methodologies.  Some of these studies construct their measures 
of job training success using data from social experiments, while others construct them by 
comparing the labor market outcomes of persons who obtained training to outcomes of persons 
from an artificially constructed control group.  An analysis using a consistent methodology and 
data from a single program subject to exogenous variation in performance measures in an 
organizational environment that is in other ways unchanging would be more definitive.  We 
describe such an analysis below. 
 
  123.2 Test using JTPA Data 
  In the mid-1980s several years after the program began, the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL) changed the performance measures used to evaluate bureaucratic performance.  In the early 
years of JTPA, performance measures were based on an enrollee’s employment status at the date 
the enrollee officially exited—or graduated—from the program.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
DOL began to de-emphasize measures based on labor market outcomes at the time of graduation in 
favor of measures based upon outcomes measured 90 days after graduation.   By moving to 
measures that captured labor market outcomes further removed from job training, DOL hoped to 
encourage training centers to offer more substantive training that would produce longer-lasting 
impacts on enrollees’ skills.    DOL required states to implement these new measures, but gave 
states some leeway in how quickly they were added.  Thus, different states made these transitions 
in different years.
7  Table 1 defines the new performance measures. 
We evaluate the relation between the goal of the organization and the new performance 
measures described in Table 1 before and after their (exogenous
8) activation.
9   Here, with minor 
exception, states were taking on additional performance measures during this period; states for the 
most part had not yet discarded the graduation-based measures.
10   We develop our empirical 
measures of performance outcomes and programmatic impacts using data from the National JTPA 
Study (NJS), an experimental study of the effectiveness of JTPA commissioned by DOL and 
conducted between 1987 and 1989.  Sixteen of the organization’s roughly 640 job training centers 
                                                 
7  See Courty and Marschke (2003b) for a description of the performance measures, incentive system, and the reasons 
for the changes in the performance measures in these years.  Courty and Marschke also detail the timing of the 
performance measure changes by state. 
8 For evidence and an argument that the establishment of performance measures were indeed exogenous to training 
centers, see Marschke (2003) and Cragg (1997). 
9 Note that we focus in this analysis on the adult side of JTPA, and ignore the smaller youth side.   
10 Fourteen of the sixteen states added one or more of the follow-up measures described in Table 1 during the period we 
study.  Over the same period, two states dropped a cost standard that had rewarded training centers for keeping costs 
per employment at graduation low.  We omit the cost measure from our change analysis because we cannot produce 
training cost estimates at the enrolee level using our data.   
  13participated in the NJS.
11  The study was conducted using a classical experiment methodology 
according to which JTPA applicants were randomized into treatment and control groups.  The 
control groups did not receive JTPA training services for at least 18 months after random 
assignment.  20,601 JTPA-eligible adults and youth participated in the study: 13,972 were 
randomized into the treatment group and 6,629 into the control group. 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on 13,338 adults from the set of participants in 
the NJS.  The data contains participant-reported information on their education level, labor market 
history, family composition, welfare program participation and demographic characteristics, as well 
as labor market, training, and schooling activity for approximately 18 months after random 
assignment.
12  In addition, the data contains enrolment and graduation dates for all experimental 
participants who also received training services. These program dates can be used with the 
participant employment spell, earnings and wage data to produce accurate measures of performance 
outcomes at the enrollee level. 
We follow the methodology of Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002), who examine the 
correlation between JTPA's performance measures  (the M in our model) and the earnings and 
employment impacts  (the V) of JTPA training using the same data we use here. We conduct 
separate analyses for each of three performance measures: the employment rate at follow-up, 
average weeks employed at follow-up, and average earnings at follow-up.  The basic idea of our 
analysis is that we construct performance outcome estimates and employment and earnings impacts 
for various subgroups of the sample.  We then correlate these subgroup outcomes and impact 
estimates and examine how the activation changes with the activation of the corresponding 
measure. 
                                                 
11 See Doolittle and Traeger (1990) for a description of the implementation of the National JTPA Study, and Bloom et 
al. (1997) for a detailed description of its results. 
12 For one quarter of the experimental participants, data were collected for an additional 18 months. This paper utilizes 
only the employment data for the first 18 months following random assignment. 
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performance measure was in effect.  The performance measures in place in each state and program 
year were obtained from documents on file in states’ departments of labor (see Courty and 
Marschke, 2003b). We then assign each experimental participant to one of two subsamples based 
on whether their random assignment date occurred in a program year in which their training agency 
was evaluated by the performance measure.  Without making some strong assumptions, individual-
specific earnings and employment impact estimates cannot be constructed from experimental data 
(see Heckman, 1992, and Heckman, Smith, and Clements, 1997). Instead, following Heckman et al, 
we construct impact estimates for subgroups based on individual characteristics measured at the 
point of application.  For each subsample, we construct 56 subgroups based on marital status, 
welfare/AFDC/Food Stamp receipt, race, age, gender, educational attainment, employment status at 
application, earnings in the year preceding application, and training centre. Thus, if an individual's 
data are complete he or she appears in our sample 56 times, but each individual appears in the data 
as many times as their data allow. For each individual in a subgroup, we compute an earnings 
figure by aggregating his/her earnings over the 18 months following their random assignment.
13  In 
the absence of a drop out problem, consistent estimates of the subgroup earnings impact can be 
obtained from a simple comparison of the 18-month earnings of treatments and controls within the 
subgroup. Over one-third of the individuals in the treatment group drop out, however. We use a 
regression framework to estimate the earnings impacts, employing a method suggested by Bloom 
(1984) to control for dropouts.
14  We similarly compute employment impacts by comparing the 
number of months of employment reported by treatments and controls during the eighteen months 
following random assignment.  Table 2A shows the estimated earnings and employment impacts 
for many of the subgroups we created.  Table 2A shows that the impacts are often small relative to 
                                                 
13 Following Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, to limit the influence of outliers, we delete from our sample persons’ in 
the top one percentile of self-reported earnings. 
14 For a comprehensive discussion of the Bloom assumption and of the problem of drop-outs in experimental 
evaluations more generally, see Heckman, Smith, and Taber (2002). 
  15their standard errors.  This is consistent with findings using these data reported elsewhere 
(Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith).   This exercise produces for each of the three performance 
measures that we study, earnings and employment impacts for up to 112 subgroups:  one set of up 
to 56 subgroups of enrollees trained in regimes where the performance measure is activated, and 
another set of up to 56 subgroups of enrollees trained in regimes where the performance measure is 
not activated. 
Because we compute earnings impacts by subgroup, we must compute performance measures 
by subgroup as well. Participants supplied monthly wage and employment information for each job 
held in the 18-month period after random assignment. The NJS data file also contains the exact 
enrolment and graduation dates from agency records.  We constructed the enrollee-level follow-up 
date-based performance outcomes using the enrollee’s reported employment hours and wage 
information from the calendar month containing the graduation date through the calendar month 
containing the follow-up date (the follow-up date occurs ninety days after the graduation date). In 
computing the enrollee-level employment rate at follow-up outcome, we considered an enrollee 
employed at follow-up if he/she showed employment in the third calendar month following 
graduation. We constructed the average weekly earnings at follow-up outcome by computing the 
average weekly earnings of all the enrollee’s employment spells ongoing in the third month 
following the graduation month and then summing over all spells.  To be consistent with JTPA's 
definition of the measure, we constructed the earnings outcome only for enrollees who were 
employed in the third month following graduation.  We constructed the average weeks worked 
outcome by aggregating the number of weeks of employment over the three month follow-up 
period. Then, for each of the performance measures, we computed the subgroup performance 
outcomes by averaging the individual performance outcomes within each subgroup, producing up 
to 56 separate subgroup outcomes for enrollees whose performance on the measures counts toward 
the training center’s award, and another (up to) 56 subgroup outcomes for enrollees whose 
  16performance does not count.  Table 2B describes the means of the three performance outcomes for 
selected subgroups in our sample. 
 
3.3 Results 
We regress subgroup estimated employment and earnings impacts on their performance 
outcomes, weighting the regression by the inverse of the Eicker-White standard errors from the 
impact estimations.  In using a regression framework, we are following Heckman, Heinrich, and 
Smith, but also the performance measure validation literature in accounting (see, e.g., Ittner and 
Larcker and Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan).  Note that this simple regression of V on P yields an 
estimate of cov(P,V)/var(P).  We thus test whether the coefficient on the performance outcome falls 
with the activation of the corresponding measure.  We take a finding that the coefficient falls as 
evidence that activating a performance measure weakens its association with programmatic impacts 
and implies gaming.   Because we have two impact measures and three outcome measures we have 
six equations, which we estimate jointly (using a seemingly unrelated regression framework).  
  
Evidence of Gaming 
Table 3 shows the results of our estimation.  The dependent variables are the estimated 
subgroup earnings and employment impacts.   Each equation contains on the right hand side the 
subgroup outcome (either the employment rate at follow-up, average weeks worked at follow-up, 
or average weekly earnings at follow-up) and the outcome interacted with a dummy variable 
indicating whether the performance measure is activated.  (Note that this model deviates from 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith only by the inclusion of the activation dummy variable.)  Each 
regression also contains an intercept and the activation dummy alone, whose coefficient estimates 
are omitted from the table.  
  17First, note that the coefficient estimates on the performance outcomes are all positive and 
significant.  This suggests that the new performance outcomes and impacts are indeed correlated 
when the performance outcomes are not awarded.  Next, note that the coefficient estimates on the 
interacted terms are jointly significant (the p value of the joint significance test is .0001).  This 
finding alone is consistent with Baker’s model of gaming, which implies a change in the correlation 
between the performance outcome and the goal with the activation of the performance measure.  
Third, note that in three of the six cases—one case for each of the three performance measures—the 
coefficient estimate on the interacted term is negative and significant.  The drop in the correlation 
between outcome and impact is consistent with the award triggering gaming activities.  The results 
suggest that each measure is gameable.   
Our model predicts that the variance of the measure should rise with activation, both because 
activation elicits additional efforts and because activation elicits gaming.  Table 4 shows the sample 
variances of the performance outcomes with and without activation of the corresponding 
performance measures.  Our evidence provides some support for the model’s prediction. In the case 
of the average weeks worked at follow-up and average weekly earnings at follow-up measures, the 
variances increase with activation.  In the latter case, the change in variance is statistically 
significant by conventional significance criteria.  The increase in the variance of the average weeks 
worked at follow-up outcome is marginally significant by conventional significance criteria.    
 
Evidence of Changes in Performance Measure Ranking 
Researchers and practitioners have used correlation methods to sort candidate performance 
measures and to rank them.  The gaming model and the evidence of Table 3, however, show that 
the correlation between outcomes and goals is endogenous.  We can also test empirically whether a 
ranking of performance measures is endogenous.   Table 5 shows the explanatory power of each of 
the three performance measures in impact regressions by whether the measure is activated. The first 
  18line of the table shows the slope coefficient estimates and R-squareds of the regressions of earnings 
impacts on employment rate at follow-up, average weeks worked at follow-up, and average weekly 
earnings at follow-up outcomes, respectively, in training centre-years where the corresponding 
performance measure is not activated.
15   The second line shows the R-squared for these regressions 
using training centre-year data in which the performance measure is activated.  The bottom two 
lines repeat the comparison for the employment impact measure. 
Consider the results for the top half of the table which show the effect of activating 
performance measures on the earnings impact regressions.   Note first that the coefficient estimates 
are all significant and positive when the performance measure is not activated.  When they are not 
activated, a ranking of the performance measures by R-squared places the employment rate at 
follow-up measure behind both the average weeks worked and average weekly earnings at follow-
up measures.  When the performance measure is activated, however, while the coefficient estimate 
for the employment rate at follow-up remains positive and significant, the coefficient estimates for 
the other measures fall—indeed they become insignificant—along with their R-squareds.  
Activating the performance measures, therefore, reverses their rankings: after activation, the 
employment rate at follow-up measure dominates the other two measures.   
The bottom half of the table shows the effect of activating performance measures on the 
employment impact regressions.   When the measures are not activated, only in the employment 
rate at follow-up regression is the slope coefficient estimate significant.  When the measures are 
activated, all coefficient estimates are insignificant, but the R-squared of the employment rate at 
                                                 
15 The R-squared is a measure of explanatory or predictive power of the performance measure because it shows the 
fraction of the variation in the impact that is explained by the variation in the performance outcome.  Others in the 
literature have evaluated performance measures by a comparison of R-squareds; see Ittner and Larcker, pp. 14-15. The 
results shown in Table 5 differ from the earlier results of Table 3 because the earlier results are generated from a single 
SUR regression.  The results of Table 3 are generated from twelve separate regressions: two dependent variables (the 
two impact measures) crossed with three independent variables (the three performance outcomes) for each of two 
subsets of the data (persons trained subject to the corresponding performance measure and persons trained absent the 
corresponding performance measure).  We estimated the twelve models separately so as to observe how performance 
measure activation affected R-squareds. 
  19follow-up regression is higher than in the others.  Thus, in the case of employment impacts, 
activation does not affect the ranking of performance measures.  
 
4 Conclusions 
An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit 
dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses.  These responses, 
however, are typically hidden from the researcher.  This paper develops a general approach to 
identify gaming.  We extend Baker 2002’s model to show that one can identify gaming by 
estimating how the correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the 
organization changes with the activation of the measure. 
Using data from the JTPA incentive system, we test the model's main prediction that the 
correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization should decrease 
after the performance measure is included in the incentive system.  To test for the existence of 
gaming, we focus on the introduction of the follow-up measures, which corresponds to one of the 
most dramatic changes in the measurement system.   For three follow-up measures, we test whether 
the correlation between each measure and the true goal of the organization has decreased after the 
introduction of the measure.  We find conclusive evidence consistent with our hypothesis.  We 
conclude that the new measures were gameable.  These findings are corroborated by our previous 
work that used the specific rules of the performance measurement system to demonstrate gaming; 
this work showed that training program managers in the JTPA organization strategically time the 
reporting of their performance outcomes (Courty and Marschke, 2004a).  
The paper also contributes to the literature on the implementation of performance 
measurement (Ittner and Larcker (1998), Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan (2000), Heckman, 
Heinrich, and Smith (2002)). Our evidence suggests that using a correlation measure to identify 
good performance measures can be misleading.  A selection method for performance measures that 
  20is based on how well measures predict the true objective (using correlation or other methods), as is 
commonly used by practitioners, has important limitations.  In fact, we show that a ranking of the 
performance measures according to how correlated they are with the principal’s objective can 
change after the performance measures have been introduced.  
  21Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Proposition 1: A performance measure is gameable if the correlation between the measure 
and the principal’s objective decreases after the introduction of the measure. 
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which says that measure 2 is gameable. QED 
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  26Table 1 
Revised JTPA Performance Measures for JTPA’s Adult Program 
Performance Measure  Description 
Employment Rate at 
Follow-up 
Fraction of graduates who were employed at 13 weeks after graduation 
 
Average Weekly Earnings 
at Follow-up 
Average weekly wage of graduates who were employed 13 weeks after 
graduation 
 
Average Weeks Worked by 
Follow-up 




1.  The date of graduation is the date the enrollee officially exits training.  A graduate is an enrollee after he/she has 
officially exited training. 
2.  All measures are calculated over the year’s graduate population.  Therefore, the average follow-up weekly 
earnings for 1987 was calculated using earnings at follow-up for the graduates who graduated in 1987, even if their 
follow-up period extended into 1988.  Likewise, persons who graduated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 
measure, even if their follow-up period extended into 1987. 
  27Table 2A 
Experimental Impacts By Subgroup 
Subgroup 
18 Month 
Earnings Impacts ($) 
18 Month 
Employment Impacts (months) 


















  Highest grade completed 


























































  Employment status at time of application 
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Table 2A (continued) 
Experimental Impacts By Subgroup 
Subgroup 
18 Months 
Earnings Impacts ($) 
18 Months 
Earnings Impacts (months) 
 Training  Center 

























































































Notes:  Robust standard errors of the estimates reported in parentheses.  The estimated impacts are corrected for treatment group drop-outs.  The 
earnings and employment impacts are estimated from the 10746 adult experimental participants who report a valid earnings figure (zeros are 
included) in each of the 18 months after random assignment.  The employment impacts are denominated in months of employment and the earnings 
impacts are denominated in dollars.  Subgroups created using AFDC receipt, marital status, and family size excluded for space considerations. 
 
  
  29Table 2B 
Mean Performance Outcomes By Subgroup 
Subgroup 
Employment Rate at 
Follow-up 
Average Weeks Worked 
at Follow-up (weeks) 
Average Weekly Earnings 
at Follow-up ($) 
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Table 2B 




Average Weeks Worked 
at Follow-up (weeks) 
Average Weekly Earnings 
at Follow-up ($) 
 Training  Center 





































































































































Notes:  Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  The performance outcome means are reported from 10746 adult experimental participants 
who report a valid earnings figure in each of the 18 months after random assignment. Subgroups created using AFDC receipt, marital status, and 
family size excluded for space considerations. 
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Table 3 
Outcome-Impact (SUR) Regressions 




Average Weeks Worked 
at Follow-up 
Average Weekly Earnings 
at Follow-up 
Performance outcome  1478.014     
(6.16) 
67.570     
(6.44) 
2.548     
(6.38) 
Performance outcome 
   X Activation Dummy 
924.906 
(0.99) 
-80.582     
(-2.22) 
-3.708     
(-2.05) 
Dependent Variable = 18 Month Employment Impact 
Performance Outcome  1.009     
(5.71) 
0.031     
(4.16) 
0.001     
(4.11) 
Performance Outcome 
   X Activation Dummy 
-1.616     
(-2.31) 
-0.040     
(-1.72) 







Notes: T statistics in parentheses.  Activation dummy coded as one if the relevant performance measure in effect, as zero otherwise.  The constant and coefficient on the 
activation dummy are omitted.   Regressions are weighted by the inverse of the Eicker-White standard errors from the impact estimations.  Earnings are trimmed in 
construction of impact estimates. 
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Table 4 
Test of Performance Measure Activation on Variance of Performance Outcome 
 
 
Employment Rate  
at Follow-Up 
 
Average Weeks Worked 
at Follow-up 
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Table 5 
R
2’s and P Values and from Least Square Regressions of Impacts on Outcomes 










Average Weeks Worked 
 at Follow-up 
 







































































































0.00   0.8498
 
0.001
* This table describes the slope coefficient estimates and R
2’s of 12 regressions of impacts on performance outcomes.  For each of the six outcome-
impact combinations, we perform two regressions: one for individuals trained in regimes with the corresponding performance measure activated and 
one for individuals without the performance measure activated. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of the Eicker-White standard errors from the 
impact estimations.  Earnings are trimmed in construction of impact estimates. 
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